Treasury

The Quorum treasury holds protocol fees and slashed bonder stakes. On mainnet it is a Safe multisig with a TimelockController for parameter changes.

What flows into the treasury

Three streams:

1. Idea-token trading fees — 15% of the per-idea FeeRouter split. Paid in the idea token, not in ETH.
2. Bounty protocol fee — 5% of every bounty amount, deducted at _approve or _reject in ForumExecutor. Paid in the bounty’s denomination (typically the idea token).
3. Slash cut — 10% of every loser pool at settlement, captured via BondingEscrow.flushProtocolCut(bountyId). Paid in the bounty’s denomination.

The treasury accumulates multi-token positions, one per active idea. There is no automatic conversion to ETH or stablecoins; conversion is a treasury-management decision.

Ownership topology

Sepolia (current)

• Owner of all 5 contracts: 0xAf44cADeDbe7430c66870931b491eDCD8ec12196 (single EOA)
• protocolTreasury on BondingEscrow: same EOA
• Relayer / dealer: same EOA

This is a development topology. Not suitable for mainnet.

Mainnet (planned)

Multisig design

The proposed Safe configuration:

• 3-of-5 signers (raises the bar without making operations grindy).
• Signer mix: 2 Quorum core team + 1 external advisor + 1 auditor + 1 DAO-elected community signer.
• Hardware-only keys (Ledger / GridPlus). No mobile-wallet signers.
• Quarterly key rotation review — verify signer access, replace lost devices.

Timelock parameters

OpenZeppelin TimelockController:

• Delay: 24h for parameter changes (e.g. setProtocolSlashBps), 48h for owner changes (setForumExecutor, setFactory).
• Min delay: 24h hard floor (no faster execution).
• Proposer role: held by the Safe multisig.
• Executor role: held by the Safe multisig (a separate role would allow public execution, which is a future iteration).
• Canceller role: held by the Safe multisig — lets the team kill an in-flight proposal if it’s identified as compromised.

The 24h delay is the incident-response window. If a parameter change looks malicious, the multisig has 24h to call cancel before execution.

Revenue distribution

Multi-token treasury balances will accrue across many ideas. Distribution paths under consideration (not committed):

1. QRM buy-back-and-make — periodically sell idea-token fees into ETH, buy QRM on the Uniswap V4 pool, add as LP. Increases QRM liquidity without burning supply.
2. Direct QRM holder dividend — pay accumulated idea-token fees pro-rata to QRM holders (gas-expensive at scale; only practical with periodic settlement).
3. Reinvest in audits / bug bounties — earmark a fixed % of fees for ongoing security work.
4. Burn — net-zero QRM supply through buy-back-and-burn. Less liquidity-friendly than (1).

Final distribution policy will be governance-decided after mainnet launch. Initial policy: hold everything, fund audits and infra from treasury.

Spending controls

All treasury outflows require:

1. Safe multisig 3-of-5 approval.
2. 24h timelock delay (if changing protocol parameters).
3. Public proposal at least 7 days in advance for any single outflow > $50k equivalent.

Emergency operational spending (audit retainers, infra invoices) below $10k is whitelisted to streamline ops; everything else goes through the standard path.

Transparency

A read-only dashboard will publish:

• Treasury holdings per token, per idea.
• Cumulative protocol fees collected.
• Cumulative slash cuts captured.
• Pending timelock proposals with countdown.
• Multisig signer set and recent activity.

Source: the on-chain events from BondingEscrow, ForumExecutor, FeeRouter, and the Safe. No private data — the protocol is open by design.